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CATEGORIES IN EVALUATION OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVIES OF COMPETING FIRMS1
Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed an explosion of research on the role of categorization in 
influencing firm behavior. As one of the clearest mechanisms of human thought, categorization is used to  
group objects based on some similarity among them (Rosch and Lloyd, 1978). When it is applied to 
organizations, researchers have explored how audiences of various types reward firms for conforming to 
categories and punish those that deviate (Zuckerman 1999; Hannan, Carroll, and Pólos 2003). Audiences 
are usually defined as collections of agents with control over material and symbolic resource that affect 
the success and failure of the firms (Hsu and Hannan, 2005). There is an isomorphism process that can be 
described as a two-stage process through which firms can gain legitimacy and audiences' resources 
(Zuckerman, 1999). In the first stage, a firm must gain the audience's attention by exhibiting certain 
common characteristics in its activities and offerings that may be readily compared to others. Activities 
and offerings that stand outside the field of comparison may be ignored by the audiences. This inattention 
by the audience constitutes the cost of illegitimacy (Zuckerman, 1999). Simply put, firms must first gain 
membership in a category to be recognized by the audience. In the second stage, legitimate firms that 
have already gain the membership in the first stage compete for the audience's resources by differentiating 
their offerings and demonstrating appeal within the category. By being different, a firm benefits because it 
faces less competition. But at the same time, firms are motivated to conform to a range of legitimate 
activities that are institutionalized in the category and are accepted by the audience as a cognitive 
consensus that describes legitimate practices and strategies that will lead to organizational success 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; Baum and Haveman, 1997; Deephouse, 1999). As such, 
one line of research suggests that a firm that spans market categories is difficult to be categorized and 
draws less attention from key audiences, and this inattention will reduce demand for the firm's offering 
and induce devaluation by audiences (e.g., Zuckerman 1999, 2000;  Zuckerman and Kim, 2003). Another 
line of research has explored the tension that a firm faces in needing to both conform and stand out – the 
challenge of conforming to a category so as to be in the “consideration set” of an audience, while then 
differentiating from others so as to avoid direct competition for resources (Baum and Haveman, 1997; 




I examine how the stock market evaluation of a firm’s innovative 
activities is influenced by the categorization of the firm and its 
rivals. I find that innovations that blur the industry boundaries cause 
negative evaluation bias, but the competing innovations by outside-
industry firms cause positive evaluation bias in firm valuation.  
 
Yet the focus of extant research left at least three gaps unexplored. First, the primary attributes 
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used for categorization of firms in extant research have been similarity in product market space (for an 
exception see Benner, 2007a). How are attributes beyond product-market participation relevant to 
evaluation of a firm’s conformance to, or deviation from, its category? Second, the extant research on 
categorical impact has not differentiated between economic penalties and social penalties for firms that 
defy the categorical imperatives. Is there evaluation bias generated by the categorization process? Third, it 
is unclear how audiences evaluate competitive threats that are generated by entities outside of the 
categories in which they place a firm. Although this is a logical extension of the logic of categorization – 
by definition, entities outside of the category are outside of the audience’s consideration set, and therefore 
the audience may not consider the effect of such entities’ actions on firms within the consideration set – 
the sociological literature on categorization has been largely silent on this issue. 
In this paper I attempt to address the above issues and explore how categories influence the stock 
market valuation of a firm's technological innovations. Categories play important role in evaluating the 
value of a firm's innovative activities. On the one hand, stock markets value highly and welcome new 
technologies or patents (Pakes, 1985; Griliches, 1990; Brundell, Griffith and van Reenen, 1999). On the 
other hand, the information asymmetry between innovators and evaluators may induce the failure in 
financial markets for valuating innovating firms (Arrow, 1962). The intrinsic conundrum and huge 
information load required in evaluating the quality of uncertain organizational activities like innovation 
leads the evaluators to rely on categories to circumvent it (Zuckerman, 1999). I suggest that investors in 
the stock market will view the innovative efforts of a firm in technological space through the prism of the 
firm’s categorization in product market space. This category-based valuation process however can create 
biased valuation. Specifically, investors will evaluate the innovative output of a firm by comparing its 
profile to the “norm” of its industrial category. Firms whose innovative output defies such comparison 
will be discounted by investors. I then argue that investors will recognize the threat of competing 
innovations when they come from within-industry rivals, but will be less likely to recognize such threats 
when they come from outside-industry rivals. I test these predictions in a multi-industry sample of nearly 
500 large publicly traded U.S. firms in an unbalanced panel covering 1980 through 2000. I am interested 
in how the same independent variables influence firm stock market valuation and future cash flows in 
different directions. I find two instances of incorrect evaluation: 1) whereas the degree of category-mixing 
innovation is negatively valued by the stock market, future cash flows are not negatively affected by it; 
and 2) whereas the stock market valuation is not affected by competing innovations from outside-industry 
firms, future cash flows are negatively affected by such competition. These results offer support for my 
predictions.   
 
 
Theories and Hypotheses Development 
 
Financial markets in the United States represent a crucial audience for publicly traded firms. The 
availability of capital resources is critical for firms' long-term success and U.S. firms are particularly 
dependent on the U.S. securities market for financial resources (Benner, 2007a). Recent studies suggest 
that investors' attention could play an important role in determining asset prices. Important news or 
information is not reflected by prices until investors pay attention to it (Peng and Xiong, 2006). Investors' 
attention however is a scarce cognitive resource (Kahneman, 1973). Given the vast amount of information 
available and the inevitability of limited attention, investors have to be selective in information 
processing. Limited attention leads to category-learning behavior, that is, an investor tends to allocate 
attention along some categorical dimensions like markets or sectors (Peng and Xiong, 2006).  In the 
financial markets, industry affiliation is the principal product category by which corporate equity shares 
are classified (Porac, Wade and Pollock, 1999; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Peng and Xiong, 2006; Mase, 
2008). Categorization simplifies problems of choice and allows investors to process vast amounts of 
information efficiently (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Moreover, security analysts, as well as other 
business critics like the Wall Street Journal, are important intermediaries in the stock market, and they 
rely heavily on industrial categories to make stocks recommendations and forecasts. Their industry-based 
opinions and  recommendations can significantly affect investors' appetite for a firm's shares. As a result, 
industrial categorization changes the salience of firms in different categories to the investors. When 
markets are segmented along categories, limited attention pushes investors, even the most informed ones 
like equity money managers, to focus on and trade only the subset of stocks of which they are aware 
(Merton, 1987). Similarly, security analysts usually develop expertises in one or two industries (e.g. 
Zuckerman, 1999, 2004). By focusing on some categories, investors are less attentive to other categories. 
It has been found that investors are unable to devote the attention needed to process potentially valuable 
information from other markets they are less aware in a timely manner (Hong, Torous, and Valkanov, 
2007).  
Technological innovation has been shown to be “value-relevant” in financial markets (Griliches, 
1990; Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg 2005; McGahan & Silverman 2006) – that is, a firm’s innovative output 
has a statistically significant impact on its stock market valuation – which indicates that a firm’s 
innovation is a salient attribute to the financial market audience. Innovative investments and activities 
lead to creation of a stock of scientific knowledge. Firms can use this stock in many different ways to 
develop and license innovations, adopt more cost-efficient production techniques, introduce new products 
and processes and consequently increase their revenues and performance. Yet, the substantial information 
load required to understand innovations and considerable uncertainty inherent in how innovations can be 
used in pursuit of market opportunities and create value for the firm gives crucial importance for 
categories from which the audience can get clues.  
In this paper, I suggest that investors and security analysts in the stock market will view the 
innovative efforts of a firm in technological space through the prism of the firm’s industrial categorization 
in product market space. Investors may rely on technological norms or paradigms in an industry to 
facilitate the valuation. Such norms provide investors the expectations on “normal” technologies that will 
enable firms in an industry to offer “standard” products to the market and create value. It has long been 
discussed in the economics of technological change literature that technologies and innovations are 
industry-specific (e.g., Malerba, 2002; Castellacci, 2008). In each industry, there can be developed a 
technological paradigm or norm (Dosi, 1982, 1988). It defines a set of selected technological problems 
and “normal” problem-solving activities, which channels and circumscribes the set of opportunities and 
constraints for firms in an industry in their innovative activities. It also defines basic or average model of 
artifacts and systems in an industry that can be described in terms of some fundamental technological and 
economic characteristics (Anderson, 1991). This “average” specimen does not have to exist in reality, but 
are accepted and agreed upon by the customers. In the case of an airplane, technological norms can be 
reflected not only in terms of inputs and the production costs, but also salient technological features of the 
products that those firms in this industry provide for the market such as wing-load, take-off weight, speed, 
distance it can cover etc. (Cimoli and Dosi). Moreover, technological norms define appropriate business 
models that generate income stream in the industry. For example, traditional photographic industry used a 
razor/blade profit model (cf. Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) that is based on the sales of film (“razor blade”) 
and not on sales of cameras (“razor”). The technological paradigm in this industry was therefore 
concentrated on chemical technologies that are related to film.  
Although the basic models of artifacts and systems in a paradigm can be progressively modified 
and improved over time, the technical progress displays strong patterns and invariance in term of the 
fundamental techno-economic characteristics of artifacts and the production process (Dosi, 1988). It is 
widely acknowledged that learning is local and cumulative. Local means that the exploration and 
development of new technologies is likely to occur in the neighborhood of the technologies already in 
use. Cumulative means that current technological development often builds upon past experiences of 
production and innovation and proceeds via sequences of specific problem-solving junctures. As 
described persuasively by Dosi (1982, 1988), one should be able to observe regularities and invariances in 
the pattern and trajectory of technological change that evolves. Therefore, technological norms in an 
industry may influence the expectation of audiences in the stock market on the innovative activities of 
firms in the industry.   
Recombinant Innovation and Valuation 
Innovation can be viewed as a process in which firms search for better solutions to a stream of 
technological problems (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Through search in the landscape of knowledge, a firm 
can create novel links between knowledge components (Fleming, 2001; Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). 
Although the paradigm may channel the search process in an industry, firms are motivated to search for 
novel solutions by exploring the recombination opportunities among diverse streams of technologies 
(Fleming, 2001; Sorenson, Rivkin and Fleming, 2006) or by searching into distant knowledge. Since 
different streams of technologies are generally associated with different industries (Dosi, 1982; 
Castellacci, 2008), such developed innovations can change the relative position of the firm vis-a-vis other 
firms in different industries and the degree to which the firm's technology profiles fit with the industry 
norms in technologies.  
Although technologies are industry-specific as suggested by the analysis of technological norms, 
technological opportunities may reside in the recombination of technologies that are associated closely 
with different industries. The current development of smart phones, for example, is a result of 
recombining technologies from wireless communications, computers and softwares industries. Diverse 
streams of technologies can create valuable recombination opportunities for highly novel innovations 
(Fleming, 2001; Sorenson, Rivkin and Fleming, 2006). Recent studies on technological diversity and 
product diversification has shown that a firm can diversify into a new industry when it can apply its 
existing technologies into the new industry (Silverman, 1999; Miller, 2004). This implies the recombinant 
opportunities across industries and innovations that capitalize such cross-industry technological 
opportunities can create value for the firm. Moreover, by recombining features from established 
technological paradigms in different industries, producers can innovate in fairly structured and 
incremental fashion (Fleming, 2001; Haveman and Rao, 2006). Therefore, recombinant innovations may 
enable producers to improve on the established norms of technologies without incur high uncertainty and 
cost in technology development.  
However, firms with innovations that are closely related to other industries may cause confusion 
in evaluation. They are more difficult to make sense of than category “purists” and as a result their 
innovative efforts are easy to be ignored or excluded from the consideration (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999). 
Moreover, the acceptance of technological norms in different industries by investors may lead to the 
perception that the value of a set of technologies is only meaningful if they are associated with a 
particular industry. Investors may be uncertain about how the technologies that are perceived to create 
value in another industry can create expected income stream in the focal industry of the firm. Such 
difficulty in evaluation is amplified by the fact that investors tend to focus only on stocks in limited 
number of industries so that they are not capable to understand technologies that are associated with 
industries they do not cover. In addition, recombinant innovations are more likely to generate 
interpretative discrepancy among investors and hinder them to reach consensus (Zuckerman, 2004; Hsu, 
2006). Lack of attributes central to the audience's acceptance may cause the investors that have different 
preference to interpret information differently. Therefore, such innovations may cause the discrepancy 
between the increased performance and reduced evaluation in the stock market. In other words, negative 
valuation bias can occur for such kind of innovations:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more that a firm's innovation is recombine-across-industry, the higher 
the evaluation bias, i.e., the stock market value is less likely to reflect the value created by such 
innovation. 
However, such categorical impact will vary for firms with differentiated organizational 
characteristics, such as the innovativeness of the firm. Innovativeness can serve as an effective quality 
signal for audiences. Continuous success in innovation can be viewed as evidence that the company is 
well managed, has sufficient technical capabilities, and has figured out and carved out a market niche for 
their innovations. Innovation portfolio can convey information about the lines of research a firm is 
conducting and how quickly the search is proceeding. It can also convey information about a firm's status 
in technological community. High status of a firm reduces the uncertainty about the quality of the firm's 
technologies (Podolny, 1993; Podolny and Stuart, 1995) and the legitimacy of their activities (Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001). However, I suggest that a highly innovative firm that is supposed to draw more 
attention from the audience will be severely undervalued when its innovations are recombinant across 
industrial boundaries. If such category-across innovation generates evaluation confusion among audiences 
and leads to ignorance from the audiences, highly innovative firms may be mistakenly ignored as other 
low innovative firms. Therefore, the highly innovation-intensive firms would suffer the most if their 
innovations cut across the industrial boundaries. This is like that the high quality entities will be penalized 
to a greater extent if they are indistinguishable from the low quality entities. Therefore, we can expect that  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The association between recombine-across-industry innovation and the 
negative bias in its stock market valuation is stronger for more innovation-intensive firms.  
Competing Innovation and Valuation 
How do categories influence the stock market's valuation of a firm when its innovative activities 
face technological competition from other firms? If categorization affects the evaluation of a firm's 
activities, it may also affect the evaluation of the firm's rivals and bring such categorical impact to bear on 
how the audience interprets the threats imposed by these rivals on the focal firm. Competition in 
technological space can be associated closely with competition in the product market (Podolny, Stuart and 
Hannan 1996) and consequently the categories in the product market, i.e., industries. However, the 
technological competition can also come from industry outsiders – firms outside the industry of a focal 
firm. If industry insiders and outsiders develop totally different technological trajectories, it is not 
necessary for the audience to evaluate the competition between them. But technological development is 
not cleanly limited by the industry categories as we have discussed in the cross-category innovation. 
Incumbent insiders can borrow useful components from technologies of firms in other industries, and 
firms can apply their technological capabilities in technologies that may be more associated with other 
industries (Silverman, 1999; Adner and Levinthal, 2002). Technological competition is therefore more 
likely due to rearrangements and recombination of elements from different technological fields and 
industries (Schumpeter, 1934; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Fleming, 2001). This causes firms in different 
industries to compete with each other for similar technological opportunities. Such common reliance on 
some types of resources in technological development increases the competitive intensity between firms 
which adversely affects each other's pursuit of market opportunities (Podolny et al., 1996). Similar 
technologies may lead to similar functions of the products and tighten the competition in product markets. 
Working in the same technologies also increases the possibility that firms possessing these technologies 
may enter each other's product markets (Silverman, 1999; Miller, 2004). Therefore, as industry insiders, 
competing innovations from industry outsiders may negatively affect firm performance.  
The paper suggests that the audiences in the stock market may evaluate the competing 
innovations from within and outside the industry differently. In the second stage of the categorization 
model (Zuckerman, 1999), audiences' attention is focused on the legitimate players that has conformed to 
the categorical imperatives in the first stage, and compete with each other to gain the access to common 
scarce resources held by the targeted audience. The audiences may develop rules-of-thumb on how firms 
react to each others' strategic moves in technologies development. For example, they may know how a 
new technologies developed by a core firm and by a niche player can have different impact on other firms 
in the industry (e.g., Podolny and Stuart, 1995). They may also have clues on whether the competition 
dynamics will be conditioned by the weak appropriation regimes in an industry (McGahan and Silverman, 
2006). Therefore, the negative impact of competition within the category is more likely to be evaluated 
appropriately by the stock market. However, the competition from industry outsiders may be ignored by 
the stock market since they can be screened out in the first stage of the categorical model (Zuckerman, 
1999). Even if the audiences in the stock market are aware of the technological competition from entities 
outside the industry, for several reasons I argue they are less likely to accurately recognize its impact on 
incumbents. First, audiences are uncertain about whether the technological competition can be translated 
to product market competition. It is common that same technologies can be shared by firms in different 
industries, but this does not necessarily indicate that these firms will compete in the product markets. 
Audiences rely on categories so that they can allocate their scarce attention to those objects that have least 
uncertainty and easier to be evaluate. Thus they are more likely to screen out the impact of those industry 
outsiders that increases the evaluation uncertainty. Second, audiences are uncertain about the strategic 
interactions between industry insiders and outsiders. How industry outsiders enter incumbents' markets 
and how incumbents will react is less predictable than the strategic interaction between incumbents. The 
consensus in evaluation of the competitive interactions is less likely to reach. Finally, this categorical 
impact can be amplified when investors or securities analysts are focused on a subset of industries and are 
less knowledgeable of firms beyond their coverage. If these audiences can analyze the information in all 
industries, they do not need to reply on categories to reduce information load in the first place. In sum, the 
competition from industry outsiders may be less captured by the stock market. Since the competition in 
the technological space is associated negatively with valuation of a firm, the less recognition of the 
competition from outside the industry may cause the stock market over-value a firm.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Technological competition from outside-industry entities will be associated 
with a positive evaluation bias in the stock market valuation.  
Finally, we can expect that such bias could be weaker if the firms are innovation-intensive. 
Although investors tend to rely on categorical information to avoid the information overload in analyzing 
the heterogeneous information of individual firms (Peng and Xiong, 2006), they may pay attention to the 
more idiosyncratic information on an individual firm if such attention is worthwhile. To attend to the 
most innovative and so that perceived competitively strong firms appears to be cost-efficient in attention 
allocation. Therefore, the stock market appears to be optimistic about and pay more attention to R&D 
intensive companies (Chan, et al., 2001). As such, more attention will be devoted to these firms' 
competitive strategies and the market situation in which they are competing, and therefore more attention 
will be given to the rivals of these firms. As a result, more attention will reduce the influence of 
categories on the biased evaluation of competitive threats from inside or outside industry rivals. 
Therefore, we test:  
Hypothesis 4: The association between outside-industry technological competition and positive 
evaluation bias in stock market valuation will be weaker for more innovation-intensive firms.  
 
 
Data and Measurement 
This study uses patents and patent citations to measure the degree to which a firm’s innovative 
output deviates from that of firms with whom it is categorized. Patents have long been recognized as a 
rich data source for the study of knowledge creation and technological change (Griliches, 1990). A patent 
is a right awarded to inventors that enables them to exclude others from the unauthorized use of the 
disclosed invention for a predetermined period of time. The front page of a patent contains detailed 
information about the invention, the inventor, and the assignee. For the purposes of this study, three 
elements of information are particularly important: the patent class to which the patent is assigned (akin to 
a technology-based SIC class), the name of the organization to which the patent is assigned upon issue, 
and the technological antecedents of the invention (prior patents, also known as 'prior art', that are cited 
on a given patent). A patent is required to disclose all the 'prior art' citations that represent important 
technological building blocks for that patent. The inventor has a legal claim only to the aspects of the 
patent that do not overlap with the technological contents of the cited patents. Such patenting procedure is 
to assure each newly granted patent to be non-obvious, novel and useful judged by those trained in the 
current state-of-the-art of the relevant technological domains (Dahlin and Behrens, 2005). Using patents 
and their backward citations, I can construct a patent-citation network that tracks the search behaviors of 
firms and degree to which these behaviors conform to, or deviate from, those of similar firms. Although 
patent data have several limitations (see e.g., Podolny et al., 1996; Fleming, 2001), their richness of detail 
and public accessibility make them particularly advantageous for identifying the location of firms’ 
innovative efforts. In addition, there is reason to believe that patent information is salient to stock market 
analysts and investors. There is extensive media coverage of patent awards, patent infringement litigation, 
and patent licensing deals, reflecting the widely diffused public beliefs and interests in the value-
relevance of patents. As such, firms tend to promote their innovative progress rather than conceal it and 
the stock market is found to react actively to the information on patenting activities (Pakes, 1985). 
Although patents are important non-financial indicators of an innovating firm's intangible assets, investors 
have great uncertainty and difficulty in assessing their value. Such uncertainty and difficulty can lead the 
audiences of a firm to rely on heuristics such as categorization, which in turn result in potential evaluation 
bias.  
To study the discount and evaluation bias in stock market valuation of a firm's innovative 
activities, I use two sources to assemble the necessary data. The NBER Patent Data set provides 
information on patents and patent citations, and Compustat database provide information on firms’ market 
valuation, cash flows and also on other firm characteristics that might affect market valuation or cash 
flows. I first extracted all public firms from the Compustat Database that have financial data on total 
assets, sales, earnings, capital expenditures and R&D expenditures between 1980 and 2000 and whose 
primary four-digit industry is between SIC2000 and SIC3999 (i.e., in the manufacturing sector). The 
original data have 38,750 firm-year observations for 4,605 firms. Firms that are included in the 
Compustat database are, by definition, large firms that are of sufficient interest to the investor community 
so that they are covered by Standard and Poor's. I then used the Compustat-NBER match files created by 
Hall and her colleagues2
I then dropped observations for a variety of reasons. Since my theoretical predictions relate to 
firms that invest in innovation, I chose to exclude not only firms that do not report R&D expenditures, or 
report R&D expenditures of $0, but also firms whose rate of patenting fell below a threshold. In the 
results reported below, I excluded from the sample any firm that was granted fewer than 50 patents during 
the 1980-2000 observation window (consistent with Silverman 1999, 2002). I also excluded firms that 
appeared in Compustat for three or fewer years. Finally, since I use three-digit industry membership to 
categorize firms (consistent with Zuckerman 1999), I dropped several three-digit industries for which 
 to link each of these firms to all patents assigned to it in the NBER Patent 
database (Hall, et al., 2001; 2005). The NBER database comprises detailed information on almost 3 
million U.S. patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during the period 1963-2002, and 
on all citations made to these patents between 1975 and 2002. Since the citation data start from 1975 
while patent applications are truncated sharply after 2000 due to the lag between patent application and 
patent granting, I chose 1980 to 2000 as my observation window. Thus, my sample includes a firm-year 
observation for every firm that operates between 1980 and 2000, inclusive.  
                                                 
2 Available on Brownyn Hall's website: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/bhdata.html. The patents are 
matched to approximately 6,000 manufacturing corporations that appear in Compustat, either directly or through 
about 30,000 of their subsidiaries (as listed in Who Owns Whom as of 1989). Great efforts have been made to ensure 
the accuracy in the name matching (Hall et al., 2005: p20).  
fewer than three firms are in the sample. There are 7,398 firm-year observations for 491 firms in the final 
sample. It represents nearly 11% of the Compustat firms in the original sample, and 19% of all firm-year 
observations during 1980-2000. These firms were granted 345,413 patents during this time frame, 
accounting for about 90% of all patents granted to all manufacturing firms in Compustat. The sample is 
clearly an unbalanced panel. Firms appear for a minimum of four firm-year observations and a maximum 
of 21 observations, with a mean of 17 observations. This can mitigate the survivor bias to a certain extent. 
The sample demonstrates a secular increase in the number of firms from 1980 through 1996, and then a 
drop in numbers afterwards. Patents exhibit a similar temporal pattern – there appears to be a strong 
increase in patents from the beginning of the 1980s, which may be a result of changes to patent 
regulations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). The declining number of patents toward the end of the sample 
period may be due to truncation associated with the time lag between a patent application and its granting 
decision; I correct for this by including year effects in the estimations below. The patenting trend 
displayed in this sample is consistent with that in the overall NBER patent database, as described in Hall, 
et al. (2005). The observations and patenting activities are also distributed unevenly across industries. The 
sample spans 14 two-digit (and 73 three-digit) SIC industries. SIC28 (chemical, biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals), SIC35 (machinery and computer equipment), SIC36 (electrical and electronic 
components) and SIC38 (medical and scientific instruments) account for nearly 75% of observations in 
the sample and more than 85% of all the patents granted to the sample firms. This indicates the 
prominence of patenting activities in industries relying on technological knowledge. The average 
(median) assets of the sample firm is $3,914 (768) millions. The sample size range from as low as $1 
million to as high as $284 billion. Therefore, the sample is representative of innovative firms with wide 
range of size.  
Dependent Variables: Ln(V/A)i,t and Earningi,t..
To measure the market valuation of a firm, the first dependent variable in my analysis is 
Ln(V/A)
  
i,t,  which is defined as the natural logarithm of firm i’s market-value-to-book-value ratio in year 
t. Consistent with Miller (2004) and Chung & Pruitt (1994), I measure firm i’s market value (V) as of 
December 31 in year t as the product of the number of common shares outstanding and the stock price as 
of December 31, plus the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock and the book value of 
its debt. The market value is then standardized by the total assets (A) of the firm. This variable is an 
approximation of Tobin's q, which requires strict assumptions about rates of depreciation and inflation to 
estimate the firm’s replacement value as well as additional data that is less readily available for all firms 
(McGahan, 1999). In a sub-sample for which I can get values of Tobin’s q using the method of McGahan 
(1999), my variable has high correlation of 97.92% with her measure of q. To measure the future cash 
flows of a firm, the second dependent variable in my analysis is firm Earningi,t
Independent Variables: Recombine-across-category Innovations   
, which is defined as the 
net income standardized by the total assets of firm i in a given year. This variable is also called ROA or 
profitability of the firm. It indicates a firm's capabilities to generate sales and income streams.  
Following Zuckerman and colleagues, I assume that a firm’s association with an industry – 
specifically, an SIC code – represents its primary categorization in the eyes of stock market analysts and 
investors (Zuckerman 1999, 2000). Although there is discrepancies between the mental categories held by 
securities analysts and the self-claimed SIC code of the firm, they are highly correlated (Zuckerman, 
1999, 2004). To measure the degree of categorical-blurring in a firm's innovative activities, I propose to 
use the technological proximity between a firm and those firms outside of its industry as a proxy. Firms 
whose innovations are spanning several industries are more likely to share technologies with firms outside 
of its home industry and move closer in technological space to firms in other industries. By definition 
technological proximity within the industry should be higher than across industries.  
 For each firm in my sample I construct annually updated patent pools – all patents that the firm 
applied for within the last five years. I then identify the primary patent class to which each patent was 
assigned, and aggregate across the firm’s patent pool to generate a count of patents in each patent class. 
Following Silverman (1999, 2002), I use first four digits of IPC class (International Patent Classification, 
in format like A02B or G02H).3 Altogether, the sample firms have patents in 547 IPC classes, although 
each firm is focused on only a subset of these classes and diversified firms generally cover broader. Thus, 
for each firm i I create a 547-element vector (Fi) to represent its position in technology space where each 
element represents the proportion of the firm’s patent pool that was assigned to the relevant patent class 
(Jaffe 1986; Sampson 2004, 2007), and for any given firm most of the elements are 0. Then, I then 
compare firm i’s innovation profile to another firm's profile by calculating the angular separation or 
uncentered correlation of the vectors Fi and Fj in year t (Jaffe, 1986), which is defined as the dot product 
of two vectors divided by length of the two vectors: Fit ·Fjt /(|Fit||Fjt|). The proximity measure is unity for 
two firms whose position vectors are identical. It is zero for firms whose vectors are orthogonal (two 
firms apply for patents in totally different technical fields). The measure is bounded between 0 and 1 and 
it is closer to 1 the greater the proximity between two vectors. This measure is desirable because it is not 
influenced by the length of the vectors. One could argue that only the closest industry outsiders influence 
the perception of investors on a firm's innovation profiles. Therefore, I calculate the proximity outside of 
the industry (ProxOutit) as the average value of the proximity measure between firm i and its closest 20 
firms that do not share a three-digit SIC with firm i. I experimented with some sensitivity tests and found 
that the coefficients estimation is not very sensitive to the number of outsiders chosen in calculating this 
variable. Higher ProxOut indicates higher degree of category mixing in a firm's innovation profiles. I 
similarly obtain the proximity inside the industry (ProxInit
I use patent citation data to measure the degree of technological competition or crowding around 
a firm's innovations. Since a backward citation link from one patent to another implies that the citing 
patent either builds up or is premised upon the technology of the cited antecedent patent, the knowledge 
embedded in prior patents can indicate the technological knowledge base of a firm. Because competition 
can be a result of common reliance on similar resources space (e.g., Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Baum and 
Haveman, 1997), I use the common reliance on technological antecedents to reflect the competition in 
technological space (Podolny, et al., 1996; Stuart and Podolny, 1996). The calculation starts with the 
citation overlap between any two firms in each patent class. To calculate overlap in patent class is 
consistent with the idea that competition is more localized (e.g., Baum and Haveman, 1997). While 
proximity measure is based on the similarity in overall activities in technological areas, the competition 
measure is based on the common reliance on the same technological antecedents in a particular 
technological field. Formally, the citation overlap between firm i and firms j in a patent class in a 
particular year t is given by the number of reference patents co-cited by patents of both firms in the patent 
class in the past 5 years, divided by the number of reference patents cited by patents of firm i in the patent 
class in the past 5 years. The measure is asymmetric for two firms. The crowding in a patent class for firm 
), as the average value of the proximity 
measure between firm i and all other firms and all other firms within the same three-digit SIC as firm i 
respectively. 
Independent Variables: Within- and outside-category Competition 
                                                 
3 At the time the examiner assigns a patent to the U.S. Patent classes, she also assigns it to one or more IPCs. 
The IPC is maintained by an international agency, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Two 
classification schemes have different features (Lerner, 1994). For example, first four levels of the IPC classification 
are nested while the U.S. system in contrast uses a great deal of cross-references rather than hierarchical structures. 
The U.S. scheme is a library classification system designed for the sole purpose of facilitating searches for patent 
examiners and therefore any correlation with industrial activity is purely incidental (Thompson and Fox-Kean, 
2005). To the contrary, the IPC system is industry and profession oriented and reflects the economic importance of 
new inventions. However, variables using two different classifications are highly correlated and the empirical results 
are quantitatively similar. 
i can be obtained by summing up the co-citation ratios between the firm i and all other firms with patents 
in that class. Higher value indicates that the knowledge foundation of a firm's patents in a technical field 
is crowded by patents of other firms. This implies that the firm's technologies may have high redundancy 
with other firms' and therefore faces greater competitive pressure in trying to generate profits from those 
patents (Podolny et al., 1996). I calculate a weighted average of the crowding measures in year t across all 
patent classes represented in firm i’s patent pool to construct a firm-level measure, Crowding with all 
other firms (CrowdAllit). I then divide this measure into two components: Crowding within industry 
(CrowdInit), measured as the crowding measure between firm i and all other firms that overlap with any 
SICs of the focal firm, and Crowding outside industry (CrowdOutit
Moderator Variables: Patent Pool 
), measured as the competition 
measure between firm i and all other firms that do not overlap with any industries of the focal firm. 
Although its effects are not hypothesized, CrowdIn will be included in the regression models for the 
purpose of comparison with CrowdOut.  
I use the count of firm i’s patents applied over the last five years standardized by the total assets 
of the firm, PatentPoolit
Control Variables 
, as a crude measure of the firm’s overall innovation production. Calculating the 
variable using past four years or six years, or use the patent granted rather than applied, does not change 
the empirical results. I use this variable to test the direct impact of innovations on firm earnings and 
market value and use the impact of its interaction with other independent variables to test hypotheses. I 
use innovation outputs PatentPool instead of inputs like R&D expenditures for the observability of the 
outputs for external audiences who may not know where the firm has invested its R&D money in. The 
value of this variable is highly skewed, but the exclusion of the extreme values of this variable does not 
change the results.  
 
I also include several annually updated variables to control for firm-level characteristics that 
might affect a firm’s market value and cash flows. Large firms are likely to have different abilities than 
small firms to take advantage of innovations. I control for this by including Firm size, measured as the 
natural log of the firm’s total assets. Some firms are perceived by investors as “earnings” investments 
rather than “growth” investments, and this may affect stock market valuation (Benner, 2007a). Therefore, 
I include Growth opportunities, measured as the growth in the ratio of capital expenditure to sales, to 
account for the possible evaluation premium due to the high opportunities that come from firm’s 
possession of new technologies (Zuckerman 1999). In addition, although our independent variables 
capture patented innovation output, I include R&D intensity, measured as R&D expenditure standardized 
by firm total assets in a year, to reflect a firm’s innovative investment (Hall, 1993). A diversified firm is 
more likely to have technologies that span the industry boundaries. Therefore, I use a dummy variable 
Diversified firm, set equal to 1 if the firm have products in more than its primary three-digit SIC, and 0 
otherwise. Finally, I include a dummy variable, No Patents, set equal to 1 if the firm had no patent 
applications in the past 5 years. This dummy variable can control for the possibility that the capital market 
treats differently those firms that have absolutely no innovative output in a given year (McGahan and 




To test hypotheses on evaluation bias, I propose to use two kinds of models. The first kind is 
market valuation model, which estimates how categorical variables can influence a firm's stock market 
value. The second kind is earning model, which estimates how the same categorical variables can 
influence the future cash flows of a firm. The comparison between these two models will provide 
evidence on the evaluation bias. For the market valuation model, I follow the conventional approach in 
innovation studies (Griliches, 1981; Jaffe, 1986; Hall et al., 2005). To reflect the firm heterogeneity and 
temporal effect, I specify a fairly general structure to incorporate firm fixed effects η i and year fixed 
effects θ t
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables. The mean of the 
dependent variable, ln(V/A), is 0.460, and the mean of the market to book value (V/A) (approximation of 
Tobin's q) is 2.107. The number is similar to the Tobin's q found in McGahan (1999) and McGahan and 
Silverman (2006), but higher than the value found in studies like Miller (2004) and Hall et al. (2005). The 
two dependent variables have bell-shaped distributions although ROA has a relatively long left tail. The 
value range and correlations in variables of firm earning, firm size, R&D intensity and capital growth are 
comparable to the literatures (e.g., McGahan, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999; Gu, 2005). It shows that large 
firms tend to have low R&D intensity, less number of patents standardized by assets, and lower market to 
book value, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Miller, 2004). The number of patents in a five 
year window has the maximum value of 9,822 (Canon USA) and a distribution highly skewed to the left. 
Firms in the sample are R&D intensive and on average around 7% of their assets are devoted to R&D 
investment.  
 (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). The valuation model per se may not provide convincing 
evidence on evaluation bias. For example, the firm value can be reduced by deviant innovation if 
deviation causes negative evaluation bias. However, this coefficient can also be interpreted as an accurate 
assessment that deviant innovation is of less value than non-deviant innovation. In other words, the reason 
that similar firms aren't investing in the areas that this firm invests in is that such investments are stupid 
and have low potential to create value for the firm. Similarly, crowding within the industry may have 
greater competitive impact on a firm's capability to generate future cash flows than crowding outside the 
industry, due to for example complementary assets, and the difference in their impact on firm value may 
just reflect this difference. In order to disentangle evaluation bias from shrewd assessment, I also look at 
earning models with the same independent variables. To reflect the future cash flows, I use the firm 
earning in t+1 and other future period earning as the dependent variable. Since the market value is based 
on the expected future cash flows in a firm, the impact of independent variables on the market value 
should be consistent with the impact of the same independent variables on the future cash flows. The 
discrepancy of direction and magnitude between coefficients in the valuation model and the earning 
model will help us to detect evaluation bias. 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5
1 Ln(V) 0.460 0.646 -3.095 3.969 1.000
2 Earning 0.071 0.155 -2.154 0.847 0.109 1.000
3 Firm size 6.607 1.914 0.016 12.558 -0.344 0.203 1.000
4 Growth opportunity 0.013 0.104 -0.131 6.287 0.096 -0.193 -0.088 1.000
5 R&D intensity 0.069 0.088 0.001 2.052 0.375 -0.511 -0.320 0.166 1.000
6 No patents 0.035 0.184 0.000 1.000 0.033 0.010 -0.097 0.045 -0.025
7 Diversified firm 0.419 0.493 0.000 1.000 -0.264 0.053 0.467 -0.056 -0.255
8 Patent pool 0.185 0.462 0.000 10.073 0.213 -0.261 -0.389 0.065 0.339
9 Proximity within industry (ProxIn) 0.225 0.164 0.000 0.974 0.236 -0.107 0.147 0.088 0.337
10 Proximity outside industry (ProxOut) 0.072 0.041 0.000 0.385 0.029 0.009 -0.035 0.020 0.108
11 ProxIn X patent pool 0.044 0.120 0.000 2.069 0.275 -0.395 -0.319 0.135 0.540
12 ProxOut X patent pool 0.013 0.045 0.000 1.452 0.138 -0.158 -0.289 0.043 0.228
13 Crowding within industry (CrowdIn) 0.130 0.210 0.000 2.000 0.197 -0.038 -0.009 0.013 0.259
14 Crowding outside industry (CrowdOut) 0.145 0.168 0.000 1.818 0.096 -0.024 -0.043 -0.032 0.171
15 CrowdIn X patent pool 0.029 0.116 0.000 5.031 0.179 -0.264 -0.192 0.090 0.355
16 CrowdOut X patent pool 0.027 0.069 0.000 1.503 0.167 -0.192 -0.291 0.010 0.266
Variables 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
7 Diversified firm -0.079 1.000
8 Patent pool -0.076 -0.173 1.000
9 Proximity within industry (ProxIn) -0.257 -0.072 0.027 1.000
10 Proximity outside industry (ProxOut) -0.330 -0.106 -0.009 0.276 1.000
11 ProxIn X patent pool -0.069 -0.178 0.723 0.312 0.011 1.000
12 ProxOut X patent pool -0.056 -0.137 0.855 0.033 0.155 0.550 1.000
13 Crowding within industry (CrowdIn) -0.119 -0.168 0.049 0.462 0.252 0.176 0.039 1.000
14 Crowding outside industry (CrowdOut) -0.164 -0.208 0.001 0.181 0.477 0.004 0.067 0.486 1.000
15 CrowdIn X patent pool -0.048 -0.125 0.480 0.193 0.002 0.651 0.227 0.407 0.120 1.000
16 CrowdOut X patent pool -0.075 -0.187 0.724 0.031 0.168 0.449 0.771 0.208 0.384 0.379
 
Table 2 reports the regression results for the valuation model. Model 1, 2 and 3 use the market 
value as the dependent variable. In the baseline model 1, we can find that Firm profitability, R&D 
intensity, and PatentPool are positively related to firm value, while Firm size is negatively related to firm 
value. This is consistent with the descriptive statistics and prior studies (e.g., Hall, 1993; Miller, 2006; 
Hall et al., 2005). But the No patent dummy has a significant and positive efficient suggesting that the 
stock market tends to give higher value for firms without patenting in the past five years. The coefficients 
for these control variables are consistent across the more fully specified models discussed below. Model 2 
includes key measures that distinguish between within-category and outside-category proximity and 
crowding. Model 3 adds the interaction between these independent variables and innovation level of a 
firm PatentPool. The detection of multicollinearity in all models shows that the highest VIF is 12.18 for 
Firm size and the second highest VIF is 8.66 for PatentPool and other variables have VIF less than 8. 
Since multicollinearity for the main variables is less than 10, it seems not imposing a serious estimation 
concern in the model except for that the standard errors of coefficients estimations might have been 





Valuation and Earning of Innovations 
Ln(V/A)_t Ln(V/A)_t Ln(V/A)_t ROA_t+1 ROA_t+1 ROA2# ROA2#
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Constant 0.795 0.786 0.762 0.198 0.214 0.209 0.224
[0.053]** [0.058]** [0.059]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Firm size -0.103 -0.107 -0.106 -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 -0.029
[0.008]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Growth opportunity 0 0 0 -0.008 0 -0.024 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.000] [0.010]* [0.000]+
Firm earning 1.405 1.396 1.4 0.313 0.312 0.196 0.191
[0.041]** [0.041]** [0.041]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.011]** [0.011]**
R&D intensity 1.008 0.964 1.007 0.125 0.192 0.078 0.129
[0.089]** [0.089]** [0.094]** [0.030]** [0.031]** [0.022]** [0.023]**
No patents 0.045 0.084 0.096 0.013 0.006 0.006 -0.001
[0.027]+ [0.032]** [0.032]** [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008]
Diversified firm 0.033 0.04 0.042 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008
[0.015]* [0.015]** [0.015]** [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]* [0.004]*
F test for firm fixed effect 18.612 17.805 17.53 4.037 4.078 7.841 8.036
F test for year fixed effect 33.942 32.355 32.22 10.863 11.328 12.795 13.839
Patent pool 0.114 0.112 0.186 -0.013 -0.046 -0.016 -0.047
[0.014]** [0.014]** [0.033]** [0.005]** [0.011]** [0.003]** [0.008]**
Proximity within industry (ProxIn) 0.317 0.329 0.029 0.041 0.023 0.027
[0.051]** [0.053]** [0.017]+ [0.017]* [0.013]+ [0.013]*
ProxIn X patent pool -0.095 -0.079 -0.032
[0.088] [0.030]** [0.022]
Proximity outside industry (ProxOut) -0.1 0.01 0.048 -0.027 0.017 -0.069
[0.180] [0.188] [0.060] [0.062] [0.045] [0.046]
ProxOut X patent pool -0.792 0.406 0.467
[0.320]* [0.106]** [0.079]**
Crowding within industry (CrowdIn) -0.092 -0.071 -0.016 -0.007 -0.007 0.01
[0.042]* [0.044] [0.014] [0.015] [0.011] [0.011]
CrowdIn X patent pool -0.157 -0.057 -0.099
[0.081]+ [0.027]* [0.020]**
Crowding outside industry (CrowdOut) 0.015 -0.019 -0.032 -0.054 -0.023 -0.035
[0.046] [0.050] [0.015]* [0.017]** [0.011]* [0.012]**
CrowdOut X patent pool 0.248 0.149 0.065
[0.151]+ [0.050]** [0.037]+
Observations 7398 7398 7398 7209 7209 7013 7013
R-squared 0.212 0.216 0.218 0.121 0.133 0.124 0.146
R_square within 0.212 0.216 0.218 0.121 0.133 0.124 0.146
R_square between 0.425 0.46 0.46 0.154 0.13 0.006 0.007
Number of firms: 491
Standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 10%
# ROA2=(ROA_t+1+0.85*ROA_t+2)  
In Model 3, the coefficient of ProxOut is insignificant although the negative sign is consistent 
with the prediction that category-mixing innovation induces confusion for audiences and reduces their 
evaluation of a firm. The coefficient of interaction term ProxOutXPatentPool is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the evaluational damage to the highly innovative firms is the most. This is consistent with 
the prediction of Hypothesis 2 and suggests that highly innovative firms are more likely to draw more 
attention from audiences if they have clear categorical affiliation and will lose more if their categorical 
affiliation is confusing in the eyes of audiences. Model 3 also distinguishes between within- and outside-
category technology-based competition. Again, I find that within-category effects are different from 
outside-category effects. Specifically, the coefficient of CrowdIn is insignificant although the negative 
sign is consistent with the general competition arguments. The coefficient on CrowdOut is negative but 
not significant. However, the coefficient of interaction term CrowdOutXPatentPool is significantly 
positive. This seems to suggest that highly innovative firms can actually be valued favorably by the 
investors if their technologies are crowded by industry outsiders. One could also interpret this result as 
that the impact of outside-industry crowding becomes less negative compared to that of within-industry 
crowding when the firm is more innovative.  
These results are also consistent with a compelling alternate hypothesis: perhaps technological 
proximity to firms in the same industry really is economically more valuable than proximity to firms in 
other industries, and perhaps the competitive effect of crowding from within-industry competitors really 
is stronger than the competitive effect of crowding from outside-industry firms. In this case, Models 2 and 
3 would merely demonstrate that the stock market is accurately reflecting the economic realities 
associated with a firm’s innovation efforts. To disentangle these alternate hypotheses, and thus to 
conclusively test my hypotheses, I estimated the effect of these same variables on firm i's future cash 
flows. To the extent that these variables influence future cash flows in the same way that they influence 
stock market valuation, the alternate hypothesis would be supported (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 2004). 
To the extent that these variables influence future cash flows differently than they influence stock market 
valuation, ideally with sign difference, evaluation bias would appear to exist. I estimate the earnings 
model to assess the effect of deviation and crowding variables on future cash flows. In Model 4 and 5, I 
use the firm’s net profits in year t+1, ROAt+1, as dependent variable. In Model 6 and 7, I use the 
smoothed firm earning in year t+1 and t+2, ROAt+1+0.85ROAt+2
I also test the smoothed earning in year t+1 to t+3, ROA
, as dependent variable. 
t+1+0.85ROAt+2+0.72ROAt+3
I find that CrowdOut has a negative and significant impact on future cash flows in Model 4 and 5, 
indicating a strong competition effect that is bigger than CrowdIn, whereas such negative impact was 
absent in market value Model 3. This sign difference in two models is the evidence of evaluation bias – 
the stock market does not anticipate the actual negative impact of CrowdOut on future cash flows. I 
interpret this result as support for Hypothesis 3. Moreover, the interaction term CrowdOutXPatentPool in 
Model 5 has a significant and positive effect on firm earnings, indicating that the negative effect of 
outside-industry competition on firm earnings is decreasing for more innovative firms. Combined with 
the positive impact we have found in Model 3 on market value, this seems to suggest that the evaluation 
bias on CrowdOut (negative for earning but insignificant for market value) becomes smaller for more 
innovative firms. This is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 4. In addition, I find another piece 
of evidence of evaluation bias in ProxOutXPatentPool, which is positive in the earning model but 
 and results 
are quantitatively similar but the sample size is reduced to 6511. I assume a 15% discount to reflect the 
reduced influence on present valuation of earnings far into the future. Models 4 and 6 incorporate the 
same independent variables as in Model 2, and Models 5 and 7 incorporates the same independent 
variables as in Model 3. Most of the control variables work in the same direction as in the market value 
model, except for the negative coefficient of PatentPool. This implies that the stock market may be 
overoptimistic toward innovation. Since all four models generate quantitatively similar estimations, I 
interpret the result in Model 4 and 5. 
negative in the valuation model. This implies the existence of evaluation bias because the stock market 
gives lower valuation for firms whose innovations are proximate to industry outsiders even if such 
technological proximity is beneficial for firm future cash flows. The sign difference in 
ProxOutXPatentPool in Model 3 and 5 suggests that the evaluation bias is increasing with PatentPool, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. But we do not find the evidence for Hypothesis 1 because the 
coefficients of ProxOut in both Model 3 and 5 are insignificant.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Firms face dilemma in adapting to the environment that is composed of both economic and social 
imperatives. On the one hand, firms need to commit to innovative effort to adapt to the changing 
technologies. On the other hand, they must conform to the expectation of audiences who may not 
understand the changing technologies. However, how the firms' technological adaptation and its 
consequence are influenced by the institutionalization process in the firm-audience interface is still under-
studied (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Berner, 2007a). The current study aims to explore the topic by 
examining whether the stock market appreciates the value-relevance of the firms' positions in the 
technological space that may be modified when firms innovate. The empirical analysis on firms' stock 
market value implies that the categorical effects that work to penalize the firms with innovations defying 
the industrial categorical imperatives on technologies will reward the firms with competition from firms 
outside the industry. The further analysis on firm's earnings indicates that the devaluation of category-
mixing innovation and the over-valuation of outside-industry competition is actually a biased valuation, 
and such bias can depend on the innovativeness of a firm. The analyses confirm the intuition that 
categorization can help to circumvent the information asymmetry problem (e.g., Arrow, 1962) or 
information overload problem (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Peng and Xiong, 
2006) in the firm valuation process, it creates additional problem by focusing audience's attention within 
the category.  
More work can be done to further our understanding of how innovative activities of firms lead to 
the industry convergence and how existing industry categories incorporate new elements in the 
technological development. Recent developments in institutional theory argue that a blending and hybrid 
form faces the least resistance from the existing institutionalized forms and facilitates the institutional 
change (e.g., Rao et al., 2005; Haveman and Rao, 2006). But how do these recombinant innovations 
erode industry boundaries and influence the evaluation of external audiences? One possible direction is to 
study categorical overlap and legitimacy transfer between categories in the technological evolution 
through the blending of technological elements. Another possible way is to examine how the status of a 
firm in the technological field influences the institutional change (e.g., Rao et al., 2005). The answer to 
these questions will have important implications for both researchers and the practitioners since the 
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